Iran and weapons of mass destruction
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- This article will incorporate material from the current article "Iran's Nuclear Program." See the discussion on that article's talkpage for the reasoning behind this move.
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Biological weapons
Iran ratified the Biological Weapons Convention on August 22, 1973. [1] To be written.
Chemical weapons
Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993 and ratified it on November 3, 1997 [2]. Like most other signatories, it possesses large stocks of chemical weapons which it is required to gradually eliminate.
Iran began development of chemical weapons in the early 1980's, in response to the extensive use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq War (see below). Iraq and some Western countries claim that Iran made use of chemical weapons of its own later in the war, a fact which the Iranian regime disputes.
Currently, Iran may be manufacturing blister, blood, and choking agents, and is thought by Western intelligence services to have done some research into nerve agents. However, Iran's ability to deploy chemical weapons is questionable. Known chemical weapons manufacturing facilities exist in Damghan, Isfahan, Parchin, and Qazvin. Stockpiles include the following chemical agents:
Iran depends on China for much of its CW-related technology; however, domestic production had become sufficient to allow for the export of chemicals to Libya in 1987.
Iran-Iraq War
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish soldiers and civilians alike suffered disfigurement and death in the most extensive use of chemical weapons since the end of World War I.
Saddam Hussein launched an invasion of Iran in 1980. Beginning in 1982, Iraqi forces used massive amounts of Western-manufactured weapons and nerve gasses against Iranian soldiers participating in human wave attacks. By the mid-1980's, this had progressed to use against civilian targets, including some twenty Kurdish villages on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border. Although some of these locations were occupied by Iranian troops or by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan militia aligned with Iran, most of the casualties were civilian. In 1986, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar publicly accused Iraq of employing such weapons in violation of the Third Geneva Convention.
The gasses and other chemical weapons were made mainly in Germany and the Netherlands, but some chemical precursors and technology also came from the United States, Italy, Sweden and France. Iraq acquired them over the years through both overt and covert channels, depending on the circumstances. Some of these transactions were legal and were carried out with the knowledge of Western governments.
It is accepted that several tens of thousands of Kurds and Iranians perished at the hands of chemical weapons during the war, although precise figures are hard to come by. Many thousands of victims in Iran remain hospitalized or permanently disabled.
See also: Illegal Dutch export of WMD's
Nuclear weapons
The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program goes back several decades. However, in recent years, due to global political changes Iran is finding its program under severe scrutiny and even facing charges of developing a nuclear weapon capability.
Iran had maintained that the purpose of its nuclear program was the generation of power; any other use being a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which it is a signatory, as well as being against Iranian religious principles. The U.S. had insisted late in 2003 that Tehran be "held accountable" for allegedly seeking to build nuclear arms in violation of its agreements. Since then Iran's nuclear development program has taken a center stage in Middle Eastern as well as world politics.
On November 14, 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator said that his country agreed to voluntarily and temporarily suspend the uranium enrichment program after pressure from the European Union on behalf of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as a confidence-building measure for a reasonable period of time, with six months mentioned as a reference. However, on November 24 Iran sought to amend the terms of its agreement with the EU to exclude a handful of the equipment from this deal for research work. This request was dropped four days later.
The U.S. has also alleged that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear missiles.
After three years of continued controversy, international pressure, and a great deal of attention from the Western media, as of January 2005, the IAEA has not found any evidence to support the charges that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, and neither the US nor any other country has provided any evidence to support such claims.
In August, 2005, Iran rejected a 34 page European Union proposal that, according to the proposal, was to help Iran build "a safe, economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power generation and research program.” The Europeans, with US agreement, hoped to entice Iran into a binding commitment not to build atomic arms by offering to provide fuel and other long-term support that would facilitate electricity generation with nuclear energy.[3] Although Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment program in November, 2004, Iran agreed to do so only on a temporary basis, and on August 6 Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi rejected the proposal saying, "We had already announced that any plan has to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium". The UN's nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, nonetheless opposes Iran's desire for a uranium enrichment program and may ask the United Nations Security Council to take action. The European Union proposal would have also required Iran to "stop construction of its heavy water research reactor at Arak.” Heavy water reactors use a higher grade plutonium and some believe that the Arak reactor could yield enough plutonium to make one nuclear weapon each year.
A 2005 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded "if Iran threw caution to the wind, and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible without regard for international reaction, it might be able to produce enough HEU for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this decade" assuming no technical problems. More plausible development programmes Iran could choose to follow would take over a decade.
Background
The foundations for Iran's nuclear program were laid in the 1960 under auspices of the US within the framework of bilateral agreements between the two countries. In 1967 the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was built and run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was equipped with a US supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor. Iran signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. With the establishment of Iran's atomic agency and the NPT in place plans were drawn by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Iran's King) to construct up to 23 nuclear power stations across the country together with USA by the year 2000.
By 1975, The US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had signed National Security Decision Memorandum 292, titled "U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation," which laid out the details of the sale of nuclear energy equipment to Iran projected to bring U.S. corporations more than $6 billion in revenue. At the time, Iran was pumping as much as 6 million barrels of oil a day, compared with an average of about 4 million barrels daily today.
President Gerald R. Ford even signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete "nuclear fuel cycle".
The Shah, who referred to oil as "noble fuel," said it was too valuable to waste on daily energy needs. The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."[1]
Numerous contracts were signed with various western firms, and the German firm Siemens began construction on the Bushehr power plant. Work was halted with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Siemens withdrew from the project. Shortly afterwards Iraq invaded Iran and the nuclear programme was stopped until the end of the war. In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards partners for its nuclear programme; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive US economic sanctions, few candidates existed. In 1995 Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the half complete Bushehr plant. It was not until 2002 that the USA began to question Iran's nuclear intentions after the MKO (a terrorist group) revealed the existence of the Natanz and Arak facilities.
Iranian side
Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly industrialising nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically [4]. Additionally, Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are fears of its oil fields eventually being depleted. It continues to argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value products, not simple electricity generation. Iran also raises financial questions, claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it $40 billion, let alone pay for the power plants. Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium ore [5].
Iran has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT. Iran, and many other developing nations who are signatory to the NPT, believe the Western position to be hypocritical, claiming that the NPT's original purpose was universal nuclear disarmament. ([6]) Iran also compares its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nations that have not ratified the NPT. Each of these nations developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel by 1968, India by 1974, and Pakistan by 1998.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a 2005 speech to the U.N. General Assembly said "We are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other states and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international community ... peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition" [7].
US claims
Since 2002, the US has insisted that Iran does not need nuclear power due to its abundant oil reserves since, it argues, nuclear power is more expensive to generate than oil power.
However, a potential reason behind US resistance lies in Middle Eastern geopolitics. In essence, the US feels that it must guard against even the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. The particular type of nuclear power Iran is pursuing is termed by critics as being dual-use technology—i.e. it can be used for peaceful energy generation, but the same technology, it is argued, could also be used to develop nuclear weapons, the same sort of situation which resulted in India's own nuclear weapons programme in the 1960s. A nuclear Iran in the region would severely increase the risks to Western countries (particularly the United States) of nuclear attack, and could potentially act as a catalyst for other middle eastern nations to develop weapons of their own, exacerbating this problem.
Although the US and, occasionally, the EU countries are often accused of maintaining a double standard between Israel and the Muslim countries, a common, albeit unproved, belief in the West is that Israel is less likely to initiate a war with Iran than Iran is with Israel. Iran does not formally recognize Israel's right to exist, and Iranian authorities have called for Israel's destruction[8]. Iran is also thought to constitute more of a proliferation risk. Accusations that Iran supports Hamas and Islamic Jihad, organizations which many Western countries categorize as terrorist, have been common in the US [9], and there are accordingly fears that Iranian nuclear weapons could eventually find their way into the hands of Islamic militants who would have fewer scruples about using them than a nation state.
Since 2003 the US has been unlawfully flying unmanned aerial vehicles over Iran to obtain intelligence on Iran's nuclear program, reportedly providing little new information [10].
International response
The claims and counter claims have put an immense amount of pressure on Iran to reveal all aspects of its nuclear programme to date. A great deal of this pressure has come from Iran's trade partners: Europe, Japan, and Russia. Iran has been slow to respond, claiming the pressure is an attempt by the US government to prevent it from obtaining nuclear technology.
Since the involvement of the IAEA, under the auspicies of Mohamed ElBaradei and the UN, Iran has responded to the American accusations by cooperating with the agency. But the degree of cooperation has varied depending on other geopolitical issues: at times the IAEA has had to admonish Iran, while at other times it has praised it.
Geopolitics
Note: there have been significant developments since this report has been published. [11] IAEA finds enriched uranium samples are not Iranian. Iran signs the additional protocol etc. Cameras installed in Iran facilities
Facilities
- Arak: A heavy water production facility. Heavy water is used as a moderator in some reactors. Iran has plans to build a heavy water reactor at this location at a later date. [13]
- Saghand: (32° 28′ 45″ N, 55° 24′ 30″ E) Location of Iran's first uranium ore mines, expected to become operational by March 2005. The deposit is estimated to contain 3,000 to 5,000 tons of uranium oxide at a density of about 500 ppm over an area of 100 to 150 square kilometers. [14][15]
- Natanz: This is currently a pilot-scale uranium enrichment facility for converting uranium ore into a form usable by power plants. It could also create highly enriched uranium HEU. [16]
- Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC): Run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). It is equipped with a US supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor capable of producing 600g of plutonium annually in spent fuel.
- Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan: A nuclear research facility. The Isfahan Center currently operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. It is run by the AEOI. [17]
- Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, located in Isfahan converts yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride. As of late October 2004, the site is 70% operational with 21 of 24 workshops completed. There is also a Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP) located nearby that produces the necessary ingredients and alloys for nuclear reactors. [18]
- Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center: Research facility investigating the applications of nuclear technology in agriculture. It is run by the AEOI.
- Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine at Hashtgerd, Karaj: Established in 1991 and run by the AEOI. [19]
- Ardekan Nuclear Fuel Site: Construction is reportedly scheduled to be finished in mid-2005.
- Lashkar Ab’ad pilot plant for isotope separation. Established in 2002, laser enrichment experiments were carried out there, however, the plant has been shut down since Iran declared it has no intentions of enriching uranium using the laser isotope separation technique.
- Parchin: Suspected, but not confirmed facility, according to the IAEA.
- Lavizan II: Suspected, but not confirmed facility, according to the IAEA.
- Chalous: Suspected, but not confirmed facility, according to the IAEA.
- Yazd Radiation Processing Center
External links
- Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes - A Net Assessment, International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 6, 2005
- No Proof Found of Iran Arms Program, August 2005.
- Forced to Fuel (Harvard Int'l Law Review, Vol. 26 No. 4 - Winter 2005) lays out the case for nuclear energy in Iran, by Prof. Muhammad Sahimi.
- Iran's Nuclear History, Prof. Mohammad Sahimi, Chairman of Chemical and Petroleum Engineering at the University of Southern California, and member of the Union of Concerned Scientists, October 2, 2003
- Preventing Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Remarks by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security to the Hudson Institute, August 17, 2004
- Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction Testimony by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Washington DC, June 24, 2004
- Report to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 April 2005
- Iran Proclaims Right to Nuclear Energy, Washington Post, September 17, 2005
- The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has published a number of informative articles on Iran in the past few years: Countdown to Showdown, Nov/Dec 2004; Schooling Iran's Atom Squad, May/June 2004; The Centrifuge Connection, March/April 2004; Iran, Player or Rogue?, Sept/Oct 2003; Iran: Furor over Fuel, May/June 2003.
