Thomas Schelling
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Thomas Crombie Schelling (born 14 April 1921) is an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the University of Maryland, College Park School of Public Policy. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial prize in economics (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis."
Schelling received his bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1944. He received his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1951.
Schelling's most famous book, The Strategy of Conflict (1960), has pioneered the study of bargaining and strategic behavior and is considered one of the hundred books that have been most influential in the West since 1945. In this book he introduced the concept of the focal point, now commonly called the Schelling point.
Schelling's economic theories about war were extended in Arms and Influence (1966).
From 1964, Schelling became influential in The Pentagon's formulation of escalation and bombing policy in the Vietnam War, through his friend John McNaughton, who was U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert McNamara's closest advisor.
In 1971, he published a widely cited article dealing with racial dynamics called "Dynamic Models of Segregation". In this paper he showed that a small preference for one's neighbors to be of the same color could lead to total segregation. He used coins on graph paper to demonstrate his theory by placing pennies and nickels in different patterns on the "board" and then moving them one by one if they were in an "unhappy" situation. The positive feedback cycle of segregation - prejudice - in-group preference can be found in most human populations, with great variation in what are regarded as meaningful differences -- gender, age, "race," ethnicity, language, sexual preference, religion, etc. Once a cycle of separation-prejudice-discrimination-separation has begun, it has a self-sustaining momentum.
Schelling has been involved in the global warming debate, the seriousness of which he considers to be overstated.[1] Drawing on his experience with the post-war Marshall Plan, he has argued that addressing global warming is a bargaining problem: if the world is able to reduce emissions, poor countries will receive most of the benefits but rich countries will bear most of the costs.
Dr. Schelling previously taught for twenty years at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, where he was the Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, as well as conducted research at IIASA, in Laxenburg, Austria between 1994 and 1999.
External links
- Nobel Prize Announcement
- More information about that Nobel Prize
- Protest against the Nobel Prize
- National Public Radio interview
- Foreign Affairs article by Schelling on Global Warming.
- How an economic theory beat the atomic bomb by Tim Harford, Financial Times, 12 October 2005
- All Pain, No Gain: Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling's little-known role in the Vietnam War by Fred Kaplan, Slate, 11 October 2005
- Extensive interview from early 2005, Richmond Federal Reserve
- An interview with Thomas C. Schelling: Interpretation of game theory and the checkerboard model by N. Emrah Aydınonat Economics Bulletin 20.10.2005